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Kwazakhele after twenty years of democracy:
the contradictory development of political
pluralism and political alienation1
Gary Prevost and Janet Cherry
gprevost@csbsju.edu; janet.cherry@nmmu.ac.za
Abstract
The article explores political participation and democratic consolidation in South
Africa 20 years after the end of apartheid. It does so through the lens of the residents
of Kwazakhele, a black township in Nelson Mandela Bay in the Eastern Cape
province of South Africa. Two surveys conducted in the month following the May
2014 elections provide the basis for analysing the political attitudes and expectations
of older residents and comparing them with those of younger residents of the ‘born
free’ generation. The findings are that while there is a high level of participation by
older residents, there is a significant alienation of youth. At the same time, the
consolidation of democracy is evidenced by the growth of political tolerance and
political pluralism, shown by the presence and (limited) support for opposition parties.
The findings include analysis of how the voting patterns in Kwazakhele contributed
to the defeat of the ANC in the 2016 local elections in the Nelson Mandela Bay
Municipality.
Introduction
This article tracks political loyalties, political participation and civic
involvement over a 20 year time period in the black and working class
township of Kwazakhele in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, and documents
the challenges now facing the African National Congress (ANC) to
maintain its traditional base of support. In 2014 the researchers surveyed
approximately 200 residents with half of the participants being aged 38
years and above, those who grew up under apartheid and voted for the first
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time in 1994. The second group, primarily 25 and under, were born when
apartheid was being abolished, the so-called ‘born free’ generation. The
primary question that the article seeks to answer is what the political
trajectory of the Kwazakhele community is after 20 years of democratic
elections, and what that trajectory tells us about the future of democracy.
To answer that primary question several secondary questions are pursued
including: for whom have the residents voted and why? Has there been any
change in dominant support for the ANC? For those that continue to
support the ANC, what is the basis for that support? For those that have
moved to other parties, what is the reason? In particular how has the
community responded to new parties over time, the Democratic Alliance
(DA), the Congress of the People (COPE), the United Front of the Eastern
Cape, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)?
Beyond voting patterns, another set of questions are posed to probe
deeper into the nature of democracy in the new South Africa: as the result
of the appearance of these new parties, can it be said that there is now an
established political pluralism in the township? What has been the pattern
of voter turnout, especially in recent elections? Beyond voting, what is the
level and character of political participation in the area? Has the
traditionally high level of voting participation in the area (close to 80 per
cent in national elections) been maintained by the ‘born free’ generation?
What is the level of civic participation and has it remained constant with
the current generation? Is the declining vote for the ANC a measure of
disconnect with the ruling party or an alienation from politics and society
more generally?
Finally, the data collected in the surveys allowed us to examine the
significant predictors of 2014 voting. Are they demographics such as age,
gender and employment; or are they behavioural variables such as those
mentioned above – political participation, civic involvement, and
involvement with local government? The sections below detail how these
behavioural variables are operationalised and used in a regression analyses
to predict voting behaviour.
The Kwazakhele surveys
The research findings in this article are based on two surveys conducted
in Kwazakhele township, Port Elizabeth, South Africa in May 2014,
following the national and provincial elections. Earlier surveys were
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conducted by one of the authors (Cherry 2000, 2011) in the same area
following national elections from 1994 forward. In 2014 one survey
focused on residents 38 years old and older, those who grew up under
apartheid and were eligible to vote for the first time in 1994. It is from this
cohort that the previous surveys going back to 1994 were conducted. In
2014 for the first time a separate survey was conducted of persons 25
years and younger, those born as the apartheid system was being dismantled,
the so-called ‘born-free’ generation. One hundred questionnaires were
completed by older adults and 96 by younger adults. Each respondent in
the survey completed 26 questions. The questions in the survey first
established basic demographics – age, gender, status of employment,
educational level, and spoken home language. It then proceeded to ascertain
whether or not they voted in the 2014 election and if so for which party
they voted.
The next section asked about their level of political involvement. Were
they party members, did they attend party meetings, and had they voted in
previous local and national elections? The next section explored the
question of civic engagement by seeking information about civic
organisations in the township and whether or not they were active in such
organisations. The next section of the questionnaire focused on
expectations and perceptions of democracy by asking questions such as:
how has South Africa and Kwazakhele changed since 1994; what has
changed in your life? Respondents were also asked whether the ANC
government had met their expectations, and asked for concrete examples
of expectations met or disappointed. The final question in this section
asked what they could do if the government did not meet their expectations.
An additional section of the youth survey asked the respondents to rank
the importance of government action on the following issues – racism,
crime, lack of social cohesion, unemployment, poverty, and slow pace of
social transformation. The question was phrased in a way to measure youth
attitudes toward government in general, not just the current ANC
government. The ranking was done by fourteen different pairings with the
request to state which issue was more important for action compared to
the other. This enabled a comparison of the working-class township youth,
with the political opinions captured in other surveys of South African
university students conducted by one of the authors (Steyn Kotze and
Prevost 2015).
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The surveys were conducted by a team of researchers who conducted
196 interviews in randomly selected households in all of the voting wards
of Kwazakhele. The researchers were students of Development Studies or
Political Studies at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, and were
Xhosa-speaking. The map of Kwazakhele was divided into five sections
(identified as A, B, C, D, E) to ensure that respondents were captured in
all areas of Kwazakhele. Forty locations in each section were selected
through using Excel’s built-in ‘random function’ to generate a set of
coordinates. A pair of researchers was allocated to each section and went
to the house closest to each of the coordinates on the map of that section.
If nobody was available or willing to respond in the first house approached,
the next house at the same coordinates was approached. The primary
selection criterion for participation beyond a willingness to fill out the
survey was an age requirement, 18-35 for the youth survey and 38 and
older for the older adult survey. The respondents also had to be residents
of Kwazakhele (not temporary visitors). The primary language of the area
is isiXhosa but the survey was written in English, with the surveyors,
speakers of isiXhosa, able to assist in verbal translation of questions and
answers where necessary. All surveys were conducted in the month
following the national election of May 7, 2014, ie between May 8 and June
7, 2014.
Election statistics and demographic data are drawn from the South
African websites for the Independent Electoral Commission and the South
African Census 2011, www.elections.org.za and www.statssa.gov.za
respectively. Although the borders of Kwazekhele township do not
precisely match the ward boundaries, the data from the seven wards which
make up most of Kwazakhele and the voting stations within these wards is
used for corroboration of the survey data. These wards are wards 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 24 and 25 of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. As will be seen
below, the IEC data corroborates the survey findings, and the Census data
broadly corroborates the demographic data of the survey. Some survey
data are counted for both surveys together (total 196), while for the
purpose of comparison between older and younger residents’ political
participation, the data of the two surveys are counted separately (100 and
96 respectively).
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Kwazakhele wards 2016
The history, demography and politics of Kwazakhele
Why should such a study of voter participation focus on the township 
of Kwazakhele? As can be seen from the demographic profile of those 
surveyed, Kwazakhele is a relatively homogenous population, in many ways 
typical of African urban working class communities around South Africa. 
Unlike the newer townships and informal settlements on the outskirts of 
the city, whose residents have urbanised in the past two decades, much 
of Kwazakhele’s population have been living in the city for generations. 
With an established and stable population with a long history of political 
activism, it is an ideal community in which to document trends in voter 
participation over time. 
Kwazakhele is an old municipal township, with a population of 
approximately 100,000.2 It was established at the height of apartheid in the 
late 1950s, to accommodate urbanised African residents of Port Elizabeth 
who were living in Korsten. In one of the biggest – but least documented 
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– forced removals in apartheid’s history, 45,000 people were moved over
a period of three years (Cherry 1988). Most of Kwazakhele still consists
of the original municipal houses, known as ‘matchbox houses’ as they are
tiny rectangular houses. In addition to these areas, there are three other
kinds of housing in Kwazakhele. Matthew Goniwe Village was originally
built as the Single Men’s Quarters, barrack-type accommodation for
migrant workers. Over the past two decades the dilapidated and overcrowded
barracks, crudely known as KwaNdokwenza, have been converted into
family housing, and services have been provided together with certain
amenities including a community hall and a row of containers for small
businesses (KwaNdokwenza means ‘where you get “done”’ in reference to
migrant workers having casual sex). There are also some areas of new
RDP3 housing built since 1994, to replace informal settlements with
formal housing and services. Lastly, there are still a few pockets of
informal dwellings without services, in the process of being replaced by
RDP houses and formal services.
Many of the older residents of Kwazakhele have a political history
going back to the 1950s, to the days before the liberation movements were
banned. The ANC had a strong presence in Kwazakhele in the early years
of the township’s existence, from 1956 until 1960 when it was banned.
From the time of the 1976 uprising, the next generation of youth of
Kwazakhele pursued a more militant path of resistance to apartheid
oppression, with the revolt in Port Elizabeth townships being centred on
Kwazakhele High School. This generation of youth, many of whom were
jailed or banned, came back to Kwazakhele in the early 1980s and,
together with older ANC veterans, built a powerful grassroots mass
movement (Cherry 2000). This movement was based in a remarkable
network of street and area committees, which linked together to form
what were known as residents’ associations, civic organisations or ‘civics’,
affiliated initially to the Port Elizabeth Black Civic Organisation (PEBCO)
and then to the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO).
Along with a powerful school student organisation, a militant youth
organisation and a women’s organisation, these civics affiliated to the
United Democratic Front, which gave leadership to the struggle from
1984 through the period of the township uprising which reached its height
in 1985-6. This uprising saw unprecedented levels of mobilisation in
Kwazakhele, the resignation of the apartheid Black Local Authority
councillors under popular pressure, and the rendering of the township
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‘ungovernable’ and apartheid ‘unworkable’. The empowerment of ordinary
working class people through their own structures and actions was
accompanied by significant violence, some of it state-sponsored, between
supporters of the UDF and those of the Azanian People’s Organisation
(AZAPO).
As a consequence, the ANC’s hegemony was undisputed by 1994 when
the transition to democracy began. The transition period between 1990
and 1994 saw Kwazakhele largely untouched by the violence which
ravaged some other townships, including KwaNobuhle in neighbouring
Uitenhage. Bolstered by important township development concessions,
the ANC built up its now legal branches with high levels of support and
participation from the residents of Kwazakhele. At one point, the
‘Kwazakhele 2’ branch had the highest membership of any ANC branch in
the region, with 13,000 members (Cherry 2000:139).
Given this political background, it is not surprising that the first
democratic election, held in April 1994, saw residents of Kwazakhele
participating in great numbers and expressing their joy at being able to
vote, as well as considerable pride in their participation in bringing about
the downfall of the apartheid regime. Long considered as a stronghold of
the liberation movement, Kwazakhele saw consistently high participation
in every election, and consistently high levels of support for the ANC,
generally above 90 per cent. This was only challenged in any significant
way in the 2009 election, when COPE gained 25 per cent of the vote in one
Kwazakhele ward from some ANC voters who were dissatisfied with the
treatment of Thabo Mbeki (Cherry 2009:121, 126). Given that Kwazakhele
voters are considered to be the ANC’s ‘prime’ constituency, it is also not
surprising that considerable efforts have gone into improving the conditions
and developing the township. Houses have been transferred into the
ownership of the long-term residents; almost all homes are electrified;
roads have been tarred, and the ‘bucket system’ has been replaced with
proper sewerage pipes in all but a few pockets of shacks.
In addition to consistently high levels of political participation in
elections, residents of Kwazakhele have maintained a fairly high level of
involvement in structures of civil society. However, this has been changing
over the last 20 years. On the one hand, there has been a significant decline
in the influence of SANCO and its structures, together with the
consolidation of the ANC branch’s influence at local level through formal
political structures such as Ward Committees. On the other, there is a new
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generation of residents of Kwazakhele, who have grown up in a democracy,
and who have other motivations for political involvement (or lack of
involvement) from their parents and grandparents. The survey helps us to
explore these changes over the 20 years of democracy, and explain the
current shifts in voter participation in the most recent election of 2014
and also to analyse the results of the 2016 local elections. The 2016
elections saw the Democratic Alliance win control of the Nelson Mandela
Bay Municipality (NMBM) and while the ANC continued to dominate the
Kwazakhele wards, its declining vote totals help to explain their overall
defeat.
Analysis of Kwazakhele voting trends
A review of the voting records of the seven municipal wards that make up
Kwazakhele (18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, and 25), for the last four elections
(2009 and 2014 national and 2011 and 2016 local) underscores the
continuing political domination of the area by the ANC, but also reveals
a declining level of support. In the 2014 national elections support for the
ANC was consistent across the seven wards, ranging from 78.5 per cent in
Ward 25 to 82.5 per cent in Ward 18. This compares to the figures from
the 2009 elections where support ranging from 70.7 per cent in ward 25
to 79.7 per cent in Ward 18. The greatest level of support in terms of
percentage actually occurred in the 2011 local elections where ANC
support level ranged from a low of 82 per cent in Ward 25 to high of 90
per cent in Ward 18. However, in the 2016 local elections the ANC victory
totals declined to a high of 78.6 per cent in Ward 19 to a low of 72.2 per
cent in Ward 20. Across the Kwazakhele wards, the party fell from a ward
average of 85.89 per cent in 2011 to 75.4 per cent in 2016, a loss of more
than 7,500 votes. This loss of votes contributed significantly to the
victory of the Democratic Alliance metro wide in the proportional
representation (PR) voting, a sharp reversal from 2011.
An explanation for the fluctuation in percentage vote for the ANC
across the four elections mainly has to do with the performance of the
opposition parties, particularly COPE and to a lesser extent the Economic
Freedom Fighters, the United Front of the Eastern Cape, the Democratic
Alliance, and the United Democratic Movement. COPE was founded just
ahead of the 2009 elections as the result of the split in the ANC that
resulted from the removal of president Thabo Mbeki before the end of his
scheduled term of office. COPE and its Mbeki supporters had considerable
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backing in the Eastern Cape and Nelson Mandela Bay. The result was 
that for a new political movement COPE gained significant traction in the 
predominantly African wards of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, 
including in Kwazakhele. The COPE vote ranged from a high of 25.7 per 
cent in Ward 25 down to a respectable 16.7 per cent in Ward 20. However, 
COPE did not fare well in the period after the election. Nationally, its success 
did not mirror the gains made in the Eastern Cape and bitter infighting 
undermined the party and its potential for growth. Some of its more 
prominent members re-entered the ANC, especially in the Eastern Cape. 
As a result COPE’s vote share dropped dramatically in the 2011 elections 
to a high of 11.5 per cent in Ward 25 to a low of 5.8 per cent in the Ward 
21. By the 2014 elections the party had been reduced to a marginal factor 
with voter totals from 4.6 per cent in Ward 25, where they have always 
had the greatest support, to a low of 1.6 per cent in Ward 18, a clear ANC 
stronghold. The rapid decline of support for COPE allowed the ANC to 
recover its position in the 2011 local election and to a lesser degree the 
2014 elections (Ferree 2011). 
The pie charts below illustrate the changes in Kwazakhele voters’ 
behaviour over the past 20 years. Chart 1a shows the consistency in 
overwhelming ANC support from 1994 to 2004, with only 6 per cent of the 
vote going to parties such as AZAPO, PAC and the UDM. Chart 1b shows 
the significant vote for COPE (an ANC breakaway) in the 2009 election, 
and Charts 1c and 1d show the spread of the opposition vote over a number 
of parties in both the 2014 and 2016 elections:
Chart 1a: Kwazakhele voting patterns 1994 – 2004 (IEC):
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Chart 1b: Kwazakhele voting patterns 2009 (IEC):
Chart 1c: Kwazakhele voting patterns 2014 (IEC):
Analysis of the 2014 elections highlights three interesting factors
beyond the almost complete collapse of COPE support – the emergence
of the Economic Freedom Fighters as a small but significant opposition
party; small but potentially significant gains for the Democratic Alliance;
and a higher abstention rate compared to the 2009 national poll. The EFF,
under the leadership of former ANC Youth League president Julius
Malema, emerged ultimately as the primary new challenge to the ANC in
2014. It presented itself to South Africa’s African majority as a legitimate
alternative to the ANC, with its roots in the liberation movement and
seeking to appeal to previous ANC and COPE supporters disappointed in
the performance of the government. The EFF, with a populist message
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emphasising land reform and free university education, sought to position
itself to the left of the ANC and capitalise on defections from the ANC,
especially from within the youth and the labour movement. Support for the
EFF was consistent across the Kwazakhele wards ranging from a high of
8.6 per cent in Ward 25 to 6.8 per cent in Ward 19. Our two surveys
showed that this support likely came mostly from youth voters. While the
youth survey included 6 EFF voters, the adult survey had none. The EFF
forward trajectory continued in 2016 surpassing 10 per cent in five
Kwazakhele wards, averaging 9.7 per cent with a high of 10.8 per cent in
both wards 20 and 21.
The dominant position of the ANC was also impacted by the efforts of
the Democratic Alliance to grow its votes in the black community. The DA
made significant gains in the ‘coloured’ townships of Nelson Mandela Bay
in previous elections, and almost gained 50 per cent of ward council seats
in 2011. The previously disenfranchised residents of Nelson Mandela Bay
were divided by apartheid into African and coloured (of mixed race)
residential areas. As the term ‘black’ is often used to refer to all those
oppressed by apartheid, including people of Asian and mixed descent as
well as ‘black Africans’, the terms African and coloured are used here to
differentiate the black residential areas which have very different political
histories and loyalties. Building off its successes in 2011 in the ‘coloured’
townships, the DA worked hard in the elections of both 2014 and 2016 to
gain black votes in overwhelmingly black townships like Kwazakhele. In
February 2015 the DA established a DA office in Kwazakhele intended to
serve constituents in all the black townships of the metro (Ndamase
2015). The DA’s efforts resulted in a modest increase from 1.37 per cent
in 2011 to 4.52 per cent in 2016.
The DA’s progress is shown below on a ward by ward basis:
Table 1. DA support, per cent by ward, 2009 × 2016
 2009 2014 2016 
Ward 18 0.4 3.0 6.1 
Ward 19 0.4  2.8 6.0 
Ward 20 0.4 2.5 4.8 
Ward 21 0.3 2.5 4.1 
Ward 22 0.4 3.4 6.8 
Ward 24 0.2 2.4 5.4 
Ward 25 0.4 3.0 3.8 
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Our 2014 survey, which admittedly included a very limited number of
DA voters, indicated that the votes may have come from younger, more
educated Kwazakhele residents. In 2016 in addition to the DA success, a
small, but significant challenge to the ANC came from the resurgent
United Democratic Movement (UDM) with 4.0 per cent of the vote, the
regionally-based African Independent Congress (AIC) with 3.3 per cent,
and the newly formed United Front of the Eastern Cape (UFEC) with 2.6
per cent.
Chart 1d: Kwazakhele voting patterns 2016 (IEC)
The relative success of COPE, DA, EFF, UDM, and UFEC, in challenging
the absolute political domination of Kwazakhele by the ANC is evidence
of a developing political pluralism in the township. In her 1995 book,
Reconstructing Political Pluralism, Avigail Eisenberg emphasises a
piece of the definition of political pluralism that was essential to our
analysis of the changing political dynamic in Kwazakhele, freedom of
political association. She writes
Freedom of association is a necessary condition of political pluralism. But
pluralist theories go beyond merely accepting the legitimacy of free
association and instead view association and multiple group affiliations as
the central elements of liberal and democratic aspects of politics.
Pluralism is not just tolerated, rather, it is the very life pulse of a healthy
polity. (Eisenberg 1995:2)
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In the context of South African politics and in particular of townships
such as Kwazakhele, the viability of political support for parties other than
the dominant African National Congress is the critical indicator of
pluralism. In the first three post-apartheid national elections in the
township there was virtually no support for or political activity on behalf
of any party beyond the ANC. That pattern was broken somewhat by the
emergence of COPE, the breakaway party from the ANC in the 2009
elections. However, the extent of pluralism, defined by multiple opposition
parties campaigning openly in Kwazakhele, only fully emerged in 2014
when in addition to COPE, the long-established national opposition party,
the Democratic Alliance and the newly formed Economic Freedom
Fighters, made their presence felt. The trend continued in 2016 with the
growth of the United Democratic Movement and the birth of the United
Front of the Eastern Cape.
While freedom of voter choice, evidenced to a limited extent in
Kwazakhele, is one indicator of pluralism, it is also evidenced in the
presence of an increasing variety of political parties. The greater presence
of a wider variety of political parties in Kwazakhele in 2014 is shown in
Chart 2 below. This chart illustrates the response of residents to the
question: ‘What political parties are present in your area?’. It thus tests not
voting patterns or party allegiance, but the awareness of residents of the
presence of political parties.
Chart 2: Which parties have a presence in your area? (2014)
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In the early years of democracy, it was only the ‘liberation parties’ that
had a presence (AZAPO and PAC in addition to the ANC) in Kwazakhele.
The chart illustrates that in recent years the presence of the DA as well as
other parties such as the COPE, the UDM and the EFF has expanded in the
township. It is argued that this expanding tolerance for a wider range of
political parties at grassroots level, is evidence of the consolidation of
liberal democracy and the growth of genuine political pluralism. Of
particular note in recent years has been the increasing visibility in the area
of the Democratic Alliance. The DA and its familiar signature blue t-shirts
have an increasing presence in the townships, especially at protests on
education issues. In 2013 DA supporters rallied in Kwazakhele over the
potential closure of Ilungelo School (Gqirana and Fengu 2013). As
detailed later the DA has made modest gains in the recent elections among
black African voters in the area. Our survey revealed that such support is
likely coming from younger, more educated voters.
The finding of greater political pluralism is corroborated by Kwazakhele
community leaders, who explain how political tolerance manifests in the
households of Kwazakhele:
There is political tolerance in the sense that in the last elections I noticed
something… COPE wanted to write the name of COPE on the walls, and
some people would take out the (posters) of parties from the walls. But
this has not caused any conflicts. In the house, let’s say there are four
people in this house, and three of them are ANC, one is UDM or COPE,
but there is no conflict, just like in the neighbourhood. Next door is COPE,
that one is UDM, but we don’t fight each other, as it was during the time
of UDF and AZAPO. (Interview with Thamsanqa Bonani, Ward 20,
April 29, 2015)
This is corroborated by another Kwazakhele trade unionist, who says:
From where I am, I think there is political tolerance, because you will find
here and there sprinkles of DA, you will find PAC, AZAPO, UDM.
There is indeed political tolerance. People live along each other, and
belong to different political organisations. There is no hatred of the
collaborators of the past. (Interview with Mziyanda Twani, April 18,
2015)
However, this should not be understood to be indisputable evidence of a
culture of tolerance within the ANC, which still in some situations
articulates a culture of being a hegemonic liberation movement; as one
Kwazakhele critic said
15
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When people do not see eye to eye be it with the ANC or whatever
organisations, they are being labelled as dissenters, as impimpis and such.
(Interview with Puiso Kekana, May 13, 2015)
Voter profiles
The table below provide a demographic snapshot of those polled in both
surveys: men vs women, employed vs unemployed, age. There was no
significant difference in voting rates between men and women in either
survey. There was also no statistical significance in the relationship
between employment and voting in the two surveys. However, age was a
determining factor as younger adults were significantly less likely to vote
than older adults.
Table 2: Demographics and voter participation
Voter turnout
The final aspect of voting behaviour in Kwazakhele that bears scrutiny is
the turnout percentage. This area has had a record of consistently high
voter participation both in terms of high levels of voter registration and
turnout at the polls. For example, in the 2009 national poll the turnout rate
was 80.7 per cent across the seven wards ranging from a high of 88 per cent
in Ward 24 to a low of 76.2 per cent in Ward 22. Voting in local elections
is always significantly lower but by national standards Kwazakhele remained
Demographics and Voting 




Gender Female 49.0 49.0  
 Male 51.0 54.3 0.274, df=1, p=.601 
Age groups 19-24 (n=43) 44.8 51.2  
 25-35 (n=46) 47.9 48.9 0.405, df=1, p=0.831 
Employment Not employed 55.2 53.8  
 Employed 28.1 48.1 0.250, df=2, p=0.882 
Adult sample    
Gender Female 61.0 82.0  
 Male 39.0 76.3 0.464, df=1, p=0.496 
Age groups 38-50 (n=49) 49.0 68.8  
 51-88 (n=51) 51.0 90.2 7.05, df=1, p=0.008 
Employment Not employed 55.0 85.2  
 Employed 29.0 65.5 5.19, df=1, p=0.023 
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above average in 2011 with voter participation between 59.2 per cent and
66.0 per cent. However, the 2014 elections saw a perceptible drop in
turnout from previous national elections of 7.3 percentage points with a
seven ward average of 73.4 per cent, a high of 81 per cent in Ward 20 and
a low of 68 per cent in Ward 19. Voter turnout in the 2016 elections
continued the pattern of decline with only 61.6 per cent voting. Table 3
below shows a steady decline in voter participation in national elections
over the 20 year period:
Table 3: Participation in national elections, Kwazakhele, 1994-2014
(Source: IEC)
The drop in turnout of registered voters is not the only story. There was
also a drop in registration of almost 7 per cent from a 2009 total of 60,398
to 56,207 registered voters in 2014. Ward 20 was particularly striking
where registered voters fell from 8,249 to 6,649, making the 2014 ward
high percentage turnout of 80.8 per cent somewhat misleading. It is in this
context that the ANC vote must be analysed. As noted earlier, the ANC
actually increased its percentage totals across Kwazakhele in 2014 versus
2009, but that is not the full picture. In 2009 the ANC received 33,031
votes in the seven wards compared to only 28,331 in 2014. In the 2016
local elections the ANC garnered only 20,373 votes.
Our survey gave some insights into the nature of the rise in both
abstention and non-registration. Based on our two surveys the non-
participation in the electoral process is primarily among younger voters.
As analysed earlier, participation rates remain very high for those 38 years
and older, staying at slightly above 80 per cent. However, there was a sharp
drop-off with the 35 and under group, to just over 50 per cent registering
and subsequently voting. The survey also revealed in the 26 to 35 year olds
a pattern of consciously boycotting the 2014 poll as a protest against the
ANC for whom they had previously voted. It was not revealed in our survey
but it also appears that a significant numbers of 2009 COPE voters may
have joined the ranks of the non-voters, as the total number of ANC voters
did not rise, but fell, and the EFF polled vote totals less than half those of
the COPE vote totals.
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In the 25 and under group there also were a significant number of non-
registrants, likely a contributing factor to the decline in actual registration
numbers and a potential worrying trend for democratic practices. On the
other hand, this is not unusual; worldwide political participation by those
25 and under tends to lag behind the older generations, but picks up as
potential voters grow older. The relatively high level of youth participation
as part of a high level of overall societal participation may have been a
creature of the dramatic democratic opening that came with the end of
apartheid in 1994.
Another important profile is that of the non-voter, especially in the
youth survey where the abstention rate reached 46 per cent compared to
only 18 per cent in the older adult survey. Of all the non-voters in the 25
and under group only one had voted in previous elections. A significant
portion, approximately 50 per cent of the 25 and under voters, was clearly
disappointed with the ANC and government performance. They cite little
change in their lives which are marked by poverty and unemployment, and
a negative view of government, especially a perceived high level of
corruption. Interestingly almost half of the non-voters expressed that they
were satisfied with government performance but they were simply not
interested in politics and saw little reason to vote. Such a segment of non-
voter is common in established democracies with lower voter turnout than
South Africa.
The profile of the 2014 non-voter among the 26 to 35 year olds was
different from their younger counterparts. More than half of these non-
voters had voted in either the 2009 national elections or the 2011 local
elections, most of them in both, and most having cast their previous ballot
for the ANC. However, this group expressed significant disappointment
with the ANC and chose to express their disappointment by abstaining
from the ballot rather than voting for another party. These non-voters
epitomised a regional and national trend of greater abstention voter in the
2014 elections.
Political alienation
For our purposes in the South African context, political alienation is
operationalised as diminishing support for the political system as measured
by political participation. The concept of political alienation is deeply
rooted in modern political science literature. In her seminal 1970 article
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entitled ‘Dimensions of political alienation,’ Ada Finifter observed that
Available evidence exists that enstrangement from the polity is widespread
in countries throughout the world as fundamental questions are being
raised about the legitimacy of political institutions and political leadership.
(Finifter 1970:389)
Writing at the time of profound political disillusionment in the United
States over the Vietnam War, Finifter argues that alienation is conceived
as a continuum and is grounded in a rich intellectual history that permitted
the ‘development of an empirical theory relating citizens’ attitudes to the
structures and processes of the political system’ (Finifter 1970:390).
Finifter goes on to distinguish four different ways in which alienation
from the political system may be expressed. The first is ‘political
powerlessness’ where the individual feels that they cannot affect the
actions of government. The second, ‘political meaninglessness’ sees the
actions of government as capricious and unpredictable. The third category
drawn from Durkheim’s ‘anomie’ sees the norms and rules of the political
system breaking down as officials do not follow legal norms. The fourth
dimension, labelled as ‘political isolation’, refers to a rejection of the
political norms and goals that are widely held in the society. This dimension
would be manifest by a belief that voting or other socially defined political
obligations are merely conformist formalities. In the Kwazakhele context,
the non-voters seem to fall within all of Finifter’s categories. Some
clearly expressed the powerlessness dimension by stating that their vote
would have limited impact or that they had little interest in politics. Others
did fit the category of being repulsed by the capricious nature of government
action marked by the non-voter that expected electricity fees to drop but
they did not. However, in the Kwazakhele context, the most consistent
manifestation of alienation was the category of anger over the failure of
public officials to follow norms often in contemporary times seen as
political corruption. This perspective was epitomised in the quote from a
survey respondent that ‘all politicians are liars’. The fourth category,
labelled ‘political isolation’ seems to describe those previous ANC
voters who consciously boycotted the 2014 poll to register their
disappointment with the ruling party.
The Kwazakhele voter and non-voter
What is the primary takeaway from the voting pattern of Kwazakhele
residents? The resilience of support for the ANC remains strong: among
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the youth, 78 per cent of those who voted and declared their preference,
voted for the ANC. Though impressive it falls short of the over 90 per cent
support for the ANC recorded in the older adult survey. The willingness of
the younger voters, those 25 and under, to break with the ANC is small and
evenly distributed between the main two national opposition parties of
2014: the EFF and the DA. The small support for EFF is mirrored in the
older survey by a small core of support for COPE, a party which, like the
EFF, was formed as a breakaway from the ANC. The small increase of
support to the DA, concentrated among those under 25, may be the most
significant trend; there was only one DA voter in the older adult survey.
The DA targeted gaining black votes in 2014 in townships like Kwazakhele,
and this survey mirrored their overall small progress in the seven wards of
the area.
Table 4. Youth and adult party choice (2014 survey, absolute numbers)
The trend of a greater abstention is probably the most significant
marker, rising to 46 per cent among the youth compared to just 10 per cent
among the older adults. As analysed in the non-voter profile, the relatively
high abstention rate among those 35 and under was a combination of
disillusionment with the ANC among the 26-35 year olds who had previously
voted for the party, and 25 and under who seem generally uninterested in
politics. Overall those who voted in the youth survey were just as politically
active as their older counterparts but they were simply a significantly
fewer number of voters. However, our surveys indicate that as the younger
groups grow older, they could become more politically active.
Beyond voting: political participation at the local level
In traditional political sociology, participation by the individual or the
citizen in political activity is viewed as ‘a virtue in its own right’ (Dowse
1986:266).  Formal polit ical participation, or participation in
representative democracy, is measured by participation (ie voting) in
elections, and in addition by participation in political party activities (eg
 
Party choice Adults  Youth  
ANC 73/82 (89%) 38/49 (76%) 
AZAPO 3/82 0 
DA 0 3/49 
EFF 0 6/49 
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attending meetings, serving on an executive) and by active involvement in
campaigning or lobbying. While Kwazakhele residents have participated
enthusiastically in elections since 1994, with a consistently high level of
voter participation from the older generation, this does not necessarily
translate into active participation by citizens in local politics. The old
UDF critique of liberal democracy was represented by the oft-repeated
refrain that ‘democracy means more than casting your vote once every five
years’.
In most liberal democracies, there are two key institutions for the
political participation of ordinary people in addition to the electoral
process. The first is the political party, and the second is the structures of
local government.
Participation in political party branches
In the case of the governing party, the ANC, participation is at the first
level through membership of a branch. Every ANC member, up to national
cabinet minister, is required to be a paid-up member of a branch. Branches
are established geographically along ward lines, with one ANC branch per
ward. Other political parties have different organisational structures, but
as the ANC is so dominant in Kwazakhele, and as it has historically built
very strong branch structures, it is worth examining involvement in
branches in a little more depth.
Residents of Kwazakhele were asked the question ‘How do you
participate in the party you support?’ Residents were asked to respond in
terms of their participation over the previous year; and could give multiple
forms of participation. By allowing multiple responses, researchers
could examine each party support item individually, or collectively sum
the individual items (1=participation, 0=non-participation) into an index
of party support. With eight items (described individually below), that
allow an index of party support to range from zero – no support of a party
– to eight – high support, with the respondent participating in all eight
measured activities. This index can be used as an independent variable in
a regression analysis to help understand who votes and who does not vote.
The older generation of residents indicated that they still engage in a
very high level of political participation, with over half (51 per cent)
attending political meetings of some kind, and nearly a quarter (23 per
cent) being members of a party branch and claiming to be paid up
members. In addition to voting for their party in both national and local
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government elections, a surprisingly high number of residents (18 per
cent) were involved in party campaigns in some way or another. Only 15
per cent of the older respondents said that they are not involved in any way
in any political party – quite remarkable when compared to participation
in political parties in the older established democracies. This, a positive
demonstration of active citizenship, is indicative that Kwazakhele is a
‘strong’ democracy in Benjamin Barber’s (1984) sense.
In the adult sample, the party support index ranged from no activities
(23 per cent) to seven activities (2 per cent).4
Table 5. How do you participate in the party you support? 2014
survey, absolute numbers
Among the youth, while paid up membership of a party branch is
considerably lower than for the older residents, the ‘normal’ forms of
political participation, such as voting and attending meetings, are the most
common and are only slightly lower than for the older residents, with 23
attending meetings, and two serving on committees. Only six were involved
in campaigns, however – compared to 18 of the older residents. What is
noticeable is that there is quite a big contrast between those who are not
involved at all, and those who are, and who named many different forms of
involvement. There is a core of 10 – 15 per cent of youth who are actively
involved in branch activities, beyond voting.
The considerably higher level of apathy among the youth is indicated by
the 40 who responded that they are not involved in party politics ‘in any
way’. Together with the 12 who did not answer, this gives over 50 per cent
of youth who are not interested in party politics – compared to 25 per cent
of older residents. It is also notable that of this 50 per cent, 36 per cent
are from those youth who are under 25 – the ‘born free’ generation. Of this
admittedly small sample of 55 younger residents, only seven had voted in
previous elections (understandable given that they may not have been
eligible in previous elections). Six claimed to be members of a party; and
12 attended meetings, while only three were involved in campaigns and not
 
Type of participation Adults  Youth 
Membership of party 22 7 
Attending meetings 51 23 
Campaigns 18 6 
Executive member 0 2 
Not in any way 15 40 
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one of them served on an executive. While this can be explained in that
generally older residents would be elected into executive positions, it
does not indicate a strong ‘youth wing’ of any party. This is perhaps also
a reflection on the general state of the ANC Youth League in the Metro,
where the regional structure had been disbanded several times in the past
few years. In August 2014 a new executive was elected, with only two of
the additional members coming from Kwazakhele (both from Ward 25)
(Kotey 2014).
An index of party support was created for the youth sample in the same
way as for the adult sample. Fifty-two per cent indicated they participated
in none of the activities, and 2 per cent indicated they participated in seven
of the items.5
Service delivery and protest
Eight per cent of the total respondents were involved in protests against
poor service delivery and housing delivery. It should be noted that protests
can vary widely from peaceful mass protests to violent actions. While this
is not a very high percentage, indicating that service delivery in Kwazakhele
is generally good, it is still significant. In the context of widespread
service delivery protests in the informal settlements all over South
Africa, it is perhaps most noticeable that in Kwazakhele, there are only
protests around particular development failures or other problems which
the government has failed to address.
The residents involved in protests were concentrated in specific areas.
Some development conflicts in Kwazakhele are where there is new RDP
housing development and where there are conflicts over housing allocation
and beneficiary lists. Another recent conflict has been over the destruction
and relocation of certain properties due to the development of Njoli
Square (a commercial node). In addition, residents have at times protested
against specific problems such as traffic accidents or rape; at times they
have taken the law into their own hands when the police have failed to
respond timeously, and have delivered ‘mob justice’ to the perpetrators.
The preparedness of residents to engage in protest is directly related to
their expectations and whether these are frustrated or not. In response to
the question ‘have your expectations been met?’ there is fairly evenly
divided response. Of the older residents, 56 per cent said their expectations
had been met, and 44 per cent that they had not; while of the younger
residents, it was the other way around, with 55 per cent saying their
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expectations had not been met, and 45 per cent saying that they had.
Engagement in protest is also related to specific disappointments and how
residents understand their actions to be effective at local level. While
unemployment is the biggest problem in the community, it is very hard to
protest against unemployment, as there is no public representative who
can be held responsible. It is easier to protest against the slowness of
housing provision, or against who is excluded from the beneficiary list for
new housing.
Regarding housing provision, for example, there are many positive
responses –
It has brought back my dignity as I am no longer staying in a shack; I have
a house and water. (survey respondent, 38-year old male kindergarten
teacher)
Although it is not clear in all cases whether these refer to new RDP
housing areas of Kwazakhele (as in the above quote), or to the transfer of
old Kwazakhele houses from municipal into private ownership. Many of
the negative responses are from people on the waiting list for housing:
The building of new houses is happening. For years I have been waiting
for new home I am still living in the back-yard. (survey respondent, 65
year old female pensioner)
We were waiting for houses. Nothing has changed, we haven’t received
anything for our stolen land. Only promises. (survey respondent, 72 year
old female pensioner)
In response to the question ‘What can you do if your expectations are
not met?’ there was a wide range of responses. However, the overall
indication is that the formal institutions for participation are accepted by
the residents of Kwazakhele. Among the older residents, by far the largest
number of respondents said they would ‘vote the ANC out’ or ‘vote for
another party’ (22 per cent), followed by 16 per cent who said they would
in some way engage through the existing channels, such as the ward
councillor. Thirteen per cent said they would not vote, and 11 per cent that
they would engage in protest or mass action of some kind. Rather than
understanding formal participation and protest as binary opposites, the
residents of Kwazakhele understand there to be a continuum between
attending meetings, voicing dissatisfaction, and engaging in disruptive
protest. Some indicate that they will engage in many ways:
There is not much I can do rather than telling my children and grand-
children to do as we did during the apartheid years and voice out.
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 Adults  Youth  
Vote for another party 22 20 
Engage through existing channels 16 18 
Not vote 13 14 
Protest or mass action 11 8 
 
It should also be noted that mass action, even directed against the ANC,
has not been seen by participants as disloyal or inconsistent.
My duty is to put pressure through protest
Rather, these actions warn the ANC that it must govern better. This was
most evident in April 2014 at a public meeting held in Lilian Ngoyi Hall
in Kwazakhele, addressed by Ronnie Kasrils. The meeting, to
commemorate SACP leaders Chris Hani and Mbuyiselo Ngwenda for
‘Heroes Month’, saw a packed hall responding strongly to the message of
various speakers, including Kasrils, critical of the ANC. The thousands of
activists who attend such meetings have been voting for the ANC since
1994, but for the first time are able to articulate strong criticisms of their
liberation movement and there is some indication that some of them may
have boycotted the 2014 and 2016 elections.
Among the youth on the question of what you would do if your
expectations were not met, the largest response was the 21 per cent who
would ‘vote for another party’, especially among the under 25s, who
mentioned that they would vote for the EFF. Nineteen per cent said they
would engage government in some way – in particular though their ward
councillor; 15 per cent said they would abstain from voting, and 8 per cent
said they would protest.
Table 6. What can you do if government does not meet your
expectations? 2014 survey, absolute numbers
Some of the older residents of Kwazakhele are less active now than in
their youth. The reasons are varied, but one indication that democracy is
‘working’ is that people do not see the need for constant activism. For
some, the attainment of democracy was itself the goal of political activism:
[The attainment of] democracy was the only reason I became involved
in politics. I never had an interest in political activities after acquiring
democracy. (42 year old unemployed female resident)
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Others feel that involvement is necessary when there is a specific problem;
once that has been dealt with, they need no longer be so active:
I attend meetings on crime and it has yielded results, it’s relatively quiet
now. (43 year old unemployed female resident)
I am old now and the factors that made me to be active have improved.
(84 year old female pensioner)
One resident noted somewhat cynically that their participation is out of
a sense of duty, but that in between elections they are not politically
active:
We just vote because it’s a duty and because of Mandela, there after we
keep quiet to vote again after 5 years. (40 year old male general worker)
Conclusions
Despite the dire predictions of some political analysts that South Africa
is facing an ‘Arab Spring’ or a ‘civil insurgency’, our survey of the urban
African working class residents of Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality
indicates the consolidation of liberal democracy. The ‘revolution of the
underclass’ predicted as a result of dissatisfaction with the limitations of
electoral politics, is unlikely to come from the residents of townships
such as Kwazakhele. Despite economic marginalisation, residents of
Kwazakhele do not see militant protest as the way to bring about change;
a combination of electoral politics (vote for another party) and ‘insider’
persuasion (work with the ANC) were the dominant choices of residents
when asked what they could do if their expectations were not met.
The rise of pluralism and the growth of political tolerance is indicated
by the presence and acceptance of a number of political parties in
Kwazakhele. Although the ANC still dominates both electoral and other
institutions at local level, this indicates a significant change from the
hegemonic politics of the liberation movement of the 1980s.
As the 2016 local elections graphically demonstrated, the ANC’s
dominant political position in Nelson Mandela Bay is under serious threat
from the twin realities of political alienation and political pluralism. The
factor of alienation is significantly reducing the turnout of black African
voters at a time when turnout in both white and coloured communities
remain strong. While these communities are largely not represented in
Kwazahkele itself this trend was primarily responsible for the ANC’s loss
of dominant position in the PR voting in the 2016 elections. The loss of
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position in the PR voting also occurred because of the growing political
pluralism in the community that saw a greater willingness to support other
parties, including the predominantly white Democratic Alliance which
gained control of the NMBM in coalition with the Economic Freedom
Fighters who gained five PR seats in the municipality, aided by the votes
they received in Kwazakhele. The ability of the ANC to recover its former
absolute dominance in the township is problematic as years of infighting
in the local party structures going back to the removal of Thabo Mbeki
from the presidency, as well as the negative impact that this has had on the
delivery of services, have taken their toll on overall party support. As in
any evolving political landscape the key question may be the political
direction the younger residents take as they age. Further research will be
needed to track whether these younger Kwazahkele residents engage in
political participation and voting as they age.
Notes
1. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Rob Daves with the statistical
analysis done in this article.
2. The 2011 Census for the seven wards gives a combined population of 100,889.
This does not correspond exactly with the boundaries of Kwazakhele used in the
research.
3. RDP houses are small formal housing units built with government subsidy since
1994, when the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was
adopted by the ANC.
4. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.678. While not at the 0.70 level, researchers considered the
fact that all eight of the variables are significantly correlated with voting, three
significantly (at p<0.05), despite the small sample size, which suggests that the
items are appropriate for creating a party support scale. The overall scale was
significantly correlated with voting (r=0.30, p=0.00, n=99).
5. Cronbach’s alpha = 0.711, which suggests that the eight items are appropriate for
creating a party support scale. The party support scale was significantly correlated
with voting (r=0.31, p=0.00, n=95).
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